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The five papers of the current issue originate from selected talks of a workshop
Causes and Tenses: Formal Perspectives, held in Krako´w (Poland) in September
2010. The aim of this event was to explore two relatively recent projects in formal
philosophy: a rigorous analysis of a modal and tensed notion of (in)determinism and
a study of common causation by means of probabilistic extendability. In contrast to
the Laplacean (in)determinism framed in tenseless terms of laws of nature or models
of a theory, the first project sets out the task of analyzing a notion of
(in)determinism exhibited in claims like ‘‘It is not settled yet if there will be a
sea battle tomorrow; however, by tomorrow evening it will have been settled
whether or not there was the battle’’. The analysis draws on the insights of the Prior-
Thomason tense logic as well as Kaplan’s logic of indexicals. Beginning with
Belnap’s (1992) theory of branching space-times, another aim of the project is to
relate tensed (in)determinism to spatiotemporal structures of current physics. The
present issue begins with three papers on some aspects of this variety of
(in)determinism.
In the first paper Thomas Mu¨ller reflects on the notion of possible history, which
is employed in all schools emerging from the Prior-Thomason theory of branching
time. A history plays a distinctive role in assessing the truth values of the sentences
to be evaluated in a given model. Possible histories also offer a theoretical grip on
the concept of (in)determinism. They are usually defined as set-theoretically
maximal objects of a certain kind. Although the formal details depend on the
particular theory, the common idea is to read this maximality as maximality with
respect to modal consistency. This calls in turn for spelling out a criterion of modal
consistency (historicity) which would accord with insights of physics. The existing
criteria, identifying possible histories with maximal chains or maximal upward
directed subsets of a base set, are, however, in conflict with some relativistic
T. Placek (&)  J. Wawer  L. Wron´ski
Krako´w, Poland
e-mail: Tomasz.Placek@uj.edu.pl
123
Erkenn (2014) 79:339–341
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9458-z
spacetimes. There is also a tension between the notion of possible histories and
pragmatics, as maximal courses of events do not seem to be tractable enough to be
useful as parameters in truth value evaluation. The paper considers two alternatives
to the received notions of history whose aim is to dispose with these disadvantages.
The paper by Jacek Wawer ties into the ongoing debate concerning the status of
the Thin Red Line (TRL) theories, which are, loosely speaking, branching theories
enriched with the notion of the ‘‘actual history’’. The author believes that TRL
theory should be conceived as a mix of actualism with eternalism. He discusses the
semantic impact of such a metaphysical view and formulates his novel TRL solution
as a set of presemantic, semantic, and postsemantic assumptions. The author argues
that the new theory does not fall prey to the usual objections and is philosophically
well motivated. He also offers an argument for a novel and more natural definition
of the actuality operator in the branching setting.
The last paper of this bundle (by Tomasz Placek, Nuel Belnap, and Kohei
Kishida) raises the question of topological features of indeterminism and
investigates it in the framework of the theory of branching space-times, whose
axiomatic form permits some definite answers. The authors supplement the
branching space-times theory by four additional postulates, which allow one to
define light cones with typical properties required by spacetimes of physics. Their
main result is that with respect to a natural topology, a BST history with definable
light cones satisfies the Hausdorff property. In contrast, with respect to this
topology, the Hausdorff property fails in a multi-history BST model (excluding
some pathological models). These results aim to clarify the recent debate
concerning the applicability of BST histories in physical contexts.
The second topic of this special issue, probabilistic causation analyzed by means
of probabilistic extendability, is represented by two joint papers, by Zala´n Gyenis
and Miklo´s Re´dei and by Leszek Wron´ski and Michał Marczyk. The history of the
subject is fascinating. One of the concepts crucial for the field—the Markov
condition—is frequently motivated by Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle,
which intuitively says that any correlations between two factors such that one is not
a cause of the other share a common cause. This idea was given a precise
mathematical formulation by Hans Reichenbach in his 1956 book The Direction of
Time. The principle was observed to be similar to a premise of Bell’s theorem and
has been widely discussed by philosophers of science. The papers by van Fraassen
(1982) and Sober (1988) convinced many that the Principle was simply false.
But a new turn in the late 1990’s brought an even stricter rigor to the field. First,
models for discovering causal structure on the basis of statistical information were
constructed (see e.g. Pearl 2000), in which (some version of) the common cause
principle is derivable. Second, Hofer-Szabo´ et al. (1999) observed that the question
whether the principle is tenable has a clear-cut mathematical aspect. They asked if a
probability space containing a pair of correlated events with no common cause can
be extended to a larger probability space, in which the replicas of those events have
a common cause, with the concepts of extension and replicas of probabilistic events
having a precise mathematical meaning. This question initiated a fruitful research
program, with a clear link to the philosophy of physics, as the applicability of the
principle to different areas of physics is inextricably bound to its validity in
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nonclassical probability spaces. The two papers mentioned above document the
latest development of this research program. In their paper Zala´n Gyenis and Miklo´s
Re´dei establish a link between nonatomicity of a probability space and the validity
of Reichenbach’s Principle inside that space; the link holds regardless of whether
the space is classical or nonclassical. In contrast, the last paper, by Leszek Wron´ski
and Michał Marczyk, deals mainly with finite classical probability spaces and shows
that a natural extension of the Reichenbachian notion is enough to prove that
Reichenbach’s Principle is valid in a lot bigger class of spaces then previously
thought.
The workshop was held at the Department of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian
University in Krako´w (Poland) on September 10–11, 2010 and gathered seven
speakers and around thirty participants. The event was generously sponsored by the
Department of Philosophy (JU), Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Research,
and research grant 668/N-RNP-ESF/2010/0.
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